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GLOCALIZING LAW AND CULTURE: TOWARDS A CROSS-
CONSTITUTIVE PARADIGM
Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol*
Good afternoon. It is a pleasure and honor to be here today. I
want to thank Professors Patricia Reyhan and James Gathii for
their kind invitation to participate in this most exciting conference.
Thank you also to Dean Thomas Guernsey, without whose support
these exciting and challenging encounters could not take place.
It is always a special pleasure, though a nerve-wracking
experience, for me to return to my alma mater and be part of these
intellectual conversations, particularly in this room where I suffered
through courses like Trusts and Estates. Needless to say, even
almost twenty-five years after graduating, I still get a peculiar
feeling when reciting facts and law to former professors such as
Kathy Katz, and to new friends and colleagues such as Nancy Ota,
Peter Halewood, and Donna Young.
I hope I am not misunderstood when I say the faculty today looks
dramatically different from back in my day. Not that the faculty
wasn't wonderful back in my day. We too had change. For example,
Kathy Katz was the second woman hired by this faculty. For those
of you who heard last night's tribute to her, I can tell you that as a
first year student in her first contracts class here at Albany Law
School, she indeed was a teacher, scholar, activist, and mentor. I
remember the activist part quite clearly. On the day we learned
that the Equal Rights Amendment was defeated because not
enough states had ratified it, she walked into class wearing a black
arm band and started the class with a moment of silence. Let me
tell you, as contracts students we might not have understood the
concept of consideration, but I assure you, we understood that.
My comment about how this faculty looks different from back in
my day is actually a very good, positive comment. Change, in fact,
is precisely my focus today. This talk, titled "Glocalizing Law and
Culture: Towards a Cross-Constitutive Paradigm," interrogates
what factors determine whether law that effects cultural change is
* Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
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embraced or rejected by a culture. In this regard, I must note at the
outset what I call the glocal nature of culture: it can be both local-
as reflected in particular native geographies-and global-as
reflected in diaspora communities.
This lecture addresses the relationship between law and culture
in three general parts. The first part consists of a brief review of
the theories addressing the relationship of law and culture, mainly
the mirror theory. But I will suggest that there is more to the
relationship of law and culture than one being an inert reflection of
the other; hence my proposal for what I call, as a working concept, a
cross-constitutive paradigm of law and culture. The second part
reviews the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"),' a law that seeks to
effect change by mandating equality for women in part by
identifying and attempting to change what are perceived as
deleterious cultural practices. As such, CEDAW has been both
successful and unsuccessful: in some instances, at least on paper,
CEDAW has changed culture; in other cases, it has failed to do so.
Third, I will look at Cuba as a particular location in which to
explore the relationship between legal change and cultural change.
Specifically, I will compare two laws in the context of Cubans in
exile and Cubans on the island. This analysis allows me to suggest
some factors that may provide insight as to whether or not law will
be effective in changing culture. It probably need not be
underscored here that, by talking about Cuba, a socialist state, I am
intentionally toying with the notion of markets which, in
globalization terms, are synonymous with capitalism and the so-
called "free markets."
THEORIES OF CULTURE
Before presenting theories of culture, it is important to define
what I mean by culture. Interestingly, many who write about
culture do not bother to explain their understanding of-or the
meaning they ascribe to-the term. The term, of course, may have
myriad meanings. I do not mean culture in the high-brow sense.
Rather, by culture, I refer to those trappings that form one's
identity and influence one's perception of the world. Culture has
both concrete and abstract qualities: it is a complex of information
that provides meaning for an individual or community in particular
G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 19 I.L.M. 33, available at
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cdw.html.
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circumstances. As to culture and the market, it is central to my
working interrogation of cultural change that the following premise
be a foundation of analysis: majority cultures should not use the
trope of culture as a sword to eviscerate local traditional practices,
heading down the homogenizing road of globalism, nor should
minority cultures use culture and tradition as shields to insulate
harmful patriarchal local practices that are affronts to human
rights norms.
Most Western legal theories, from classical Greek, to legal
positivism, to sociological theories, start with a basic common
presumption: that law is a derivation of the culture that surrounds
it, i.e., that law is a mirror of society that operates to maintain
social order.2 The mirror thesis is the idea that,
[1]egal systems do not float in some cultural void, free of
space and time and social context; necessarily, they reflect
what is happening in their own societies. In the long run,
they assume the shape of these societies, like a glove that
molds itself to the shape of a person's hand.3
Another articulation is that "law mirrors ... a part of social life."4
Interestingly, the assumption that law is a mirror of society that
functions to maintain social order is so strong "that it is routinely
asserted by social and legal theorists without supportive evidence or
argument, with a sense ... [that it is] self-evident."' This perhaps
explains why this theory remains dominant as to the relationship
between law and culture. This broad and blind acceptance, in a
peculiar way, makes logical sense. Laws are, in essence, codified
forms of the customs and habits of the societies in which they
originate. To some extent, as well, they must reflect conduct that is
deemed appropriate and acceptable in those societies. On the other
hand, conduct that is viewed as illegitimate would not be embraced
by codification or as accepted practice. People tacitly agree to live
by those norms governing their communities, thereby legitimizing
generally accepted conduct. This reasoning, of course, becomes
circular.
Evolutionary theories of culture, for example, largely take this
2 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 1 (2001). But see
ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE (2d ed. Temple Univ. Press 2001) (1977)
(observing that the law may be more of a reflection of the interests of the ruling elite than of
society as a whole).
' Lawrence Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32
STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 72 (1996).
4 DURKHEIM AND THE LAW 34 (Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds., 1983).
5 TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 1-2.
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position by their basic assumption that cultures develop along much
the same evolutionary lines as do creatures. Those that are
"fittest"-that is, make the most positive cultural contributions-
survive, while the rest die out through war and conquest, internal
political strife, or absorption by "fitter" cultures. Under such a
model, effective law serves as a positive cultural contribution, and
those societies with more effective law are more likely to thrive.
Significantly, mirror image theorists react against the
universalist character of natural law theories and argue that reason
applied to different circumstances would result, not in one universal
law, but rather in laws as varied and particular as the nations in
which they exist. In this analysis, all facets of a society would have
an impact on what sort of laws would be appropriate for that
specific society. Such a view suggests that culture is law. This
makes sense; after all, what is law if not a set of norms that guides
and informs human behavior and interaction, including cultural
norms, conduct, perceptions, understandings, communications, and
exchanges? This view, that social norms of acceptable conduct are
the same as law, goes as far back as the ancient Greeks.
These observations also reveal that law, to be effective, need not
be made solely in an official prescriptive fashion by the state.6
Rather, everyday codes of conduct, in civil society settings such as
families, communities, businesses, schools, churches, and other
voluntary associations and organizations are all law, whether or not
they are recognized and codified by the state's legal apparatus.7 In
some contexts, this "living law" may be even more effective than the
legal norms created by the state, some of which may not reflect the
norms of the society generally.
At the same time, government-sponsored norm change is not
limited simply to actual laws, but may also take the form of less
formal social programs, supports, or policies. A number of tools
such as education, persuasion, economic incentives or disincentives,
time, place and manner restrictions, shunning, and/or outright
coercion or prohibition of undesirable conduct may effect norm
change.' Of course, in all of the analyses, one must be sensitive to
6 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (noting that formal state law is but one form of legal order in society and
often is not the controlling legal order which may be generated by informal societal controls).
' See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 915-16
(1996) (recognizing the tremendous influence that social norms have on individual judgments
and choices).
' See id. at 758-59 (explaining that governments may partly succeed in changing norms
through direct coercion, but that much of this task is accomplished through efforts to
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the subordinating or marginalizing consequences of cultural tropes
imposed by the powerful on the vulnerable. This complex of
relations and institutions-private and public, formal and
informal-informs my proposed cross-constitutive paradigm. 9 This
paradigm accepts that culture creates law and that law creates
culture-for both good and bad.
The acceptability or unacceptability of norms reflects or embodies
the will of the community, while community norms generate
compatible behavior. This cross-constitutive process is grounded in
community morality and reason, which also serve as legitimizing
forces for law. Again, those laws that conflict with moral codes or
those that seem irrational are unlikely to win the support and
consent of the populace and thus are unlikely to become "lived" law.
Of the two Cuban laws I will address, one shows that law can
change culture and the other shows that cultural norms can
withstand, survive and effectively reject legal change. Before I
discuss that specific scenario, let me turn to CEDAW, as it sheds
light on the relationship between law and culture.
CEDAW
CEDAW is an example of a law that seeks expressly to change
culture by mandating sex equality in a world in which the reality is
anything but. In so doing, CEDAW has also evoked a reaction-
here I am talking about the State Parties' extensive reservations-
that shows culture resisting changes imposed by the law.
I will briefly highlight some of the norm changing provisions of
CEDAW that expressly seek to change cultural tropes. To this
audience, I need not specify the details of the strong rejection of a
universalist notion of cultural equality. In this regard, national
statements claiming, for example, that the state is on board with
equality as long as it does not disrupt the laws of the Koran ° or
conflict with succession schemes in monarchical regimes," are
indirectly "inculcate the relevant norms').
9 This cross-constitutive proposal is supported by the theoretical work of others.
Tamanaha, for example, mentions that his mirror thesis might well work both ways, with
culture reflecting law as law reflects culture. See TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 231-36.
Similarly, ancient Greeks felt that law could serve an educational purpose in creating good
citizens. This educational function of law means that law creates better citizens, and better
citizens effect a change in culture. In contemporary times, Cass Sunstein suggests that laws
themselves can create cultural change. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 958-59.
'0 See LIESBETH LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY AND
RUIN? 307 (1995) (describing Bangladesh, Egypt, and Iraq's objections based on Shari'a law).
" See, e.g., id. at 306 (describing reservations of the United Kingdom with respect to royal
2003]
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evidence of cultural resistance to social norm transformation by
legal fiat.
That CEDAW seeks to effect cultural change is not in dispute. Its
preambular language specifically notes that the State Parties are
"[a]ware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the
role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full
equality between men and women."1 2 In setting out the aspiration
of equality, CEDAW refers to the Universal Declaration,'3 to the
ICCPR 4 and to the Economic Covenant." Interestingly, all of these
already include sex-equality mandates. Yet these mandates have
been ineffective in changing the condition of women in every society
in the world. Hence, while CEDAW is needed and welcomed, this is
not to say that it has been, or will be effective.
CEDAW's article 2 mandates that states enact laws to change the
culture of inequality. Subsection (f) requires State Parties "[t]o take
all appropriate meisures, including legislation, to modify or abolish
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women."'16 Article 3 requires that states take
measures in, among other fields, the cultural field, "to ensure the
full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of
guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men."'7 Article 5
requires that states modify the social and cultural patterns of the
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customs and all other practices which
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. 8 Finally,
Article 13 requires State Parties to take measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in economic and social life,
specifically including the right to participate in all aspects of
cultural life.' 9
These provisions show that law-here CEDAW-seeks to change
succession); see generally id. 356-62 (describing United Kingdom reservations).
12 CEDAW, supra note 2, at preamble.
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
," International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
,6 CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 2 (emphasis added).
'7 Id. at art. 3.
, Id. at art. 5.
'9 Id. at art. 13.
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culture. The ratification of the treaty evidences a willingness of
states to have law change culture, at least at the formal state level.
On the other hand, the reservations to CEDAW show that some
cultural traditions remain impermeable to attempted legal change,
and that the states are willing to use the weight of their
international legal personality to prevent such change.
Next we move on to the Cuba examples I want to explore. In
considering these, it is significant to note that Cuba signed CEDAW
on March 6, 1980, and ratified it on July 17, 1980.20 Thus, Cuba's
legal commitment to sex equality is confirmed in both its domestic
undertakings-as the following section explains-and its
international obligations.
CUBA: LAW AND CULTURE
Cuba presents an interesting site for interrogations about the
relationship of law and culture because, in effect, there are two
Cubas that can be compared. The first Cuba is the island sovereign.
The second Cuba is the Cuban diaspora. Until the 1959 revolution
the two Cubas were one, with shared history and culture. The
revolution caused the separation, and thus allows for the
investigation of whether there is some essence of Cubanidad that
resists change. In this context I am going to explore two post-1959
legal changes in the island: a general legal change and a specific
legal change-neither of which was experienced by Cubans in the
diaspora. In this context, I will compare the two Cubas to see if
they have followed different cultural trajectories.
The general legal change is the wholesale legal reform that
followed in the wake of the revolution and the imposition/embrace of
a communist regime on the island. Castro not only outlawed
private industry by instituting agrarian reforms as part of the
wholesale nationalization of means of production, but he also
outlawed religion and religious practice. In addition, specifically of
interest to women, he acknowledged women's inequality and forged
ahead with what he dubbed a "revolution within the [r]evolution",1
as a means of liberating women, having them attain equality and
become productive members of society. In a communist state, this
20 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, at
http://untreaty.un.org/EnglishStatus/Chapter-iv/treatylO.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
2 See Susan Kaufman Purcell, Modernizing Women for a Modern Society: The Cuban Case,
in FEMALE AND MALE IN LATIN AMERICA 257, 258 (Ann Pescatello ed., 1973).
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meant that women would leave the home and engage in the
productive work of the collective. Castro created the Federaci6n de
Mujeres Cubanas ("FMC") who were primary actors in an
alphabetization program which trained domestics and prostitutes
for more fruitful employment in the early days of the revolution.22
The FMC was also responsible for sending brigades to the country
to educate the rural population.
In addition, programs like maternity leave and children's circles
were instituted so that the system could accommodate women's
reproductive roles as well as ensure that childcare concerns would
not hold women back from joining the workforce.23 This effectively
created state protection of maternity and a public substitute for the
tasks of motherhood. Notably, Cuba's pre-Castro era constitution
was one of the most progressive in the world for women. 24  As a
matter of paper rights it fully recognized women's equality. Pre-
Castro reforms included family law and property law reforms that
created rights for women that some Latin-American states have yet
to achieve.
Thus, the "general" reforms are the wholesale agrarian reform,
nationalization of property, and secularization of society. The
particular legal reform on which I will focus is the 1975 family code
which requires that men and women be equally responsible for the
raising and care of children. 25 This law was so strongly embraced
that it is even incorporated into the marriage ceremony. Further,
the rights and obligations of this law are enforceable in the courts.
With these two legal reforms in mind, I asked myself, did these
legal reforms-the general and the specific-effect changes in the
way people actually live their lives? Here, the comparison with the
diaspora is particularly useful as it presents a Cuban population
with the same history but no reform laws. The question then
becomes: Did culture resist or has there been change? The answer
22 Id. at 262-63.
23 See, e.g., Lois M. Smith & Alfredo Padula, The Cuban Family in the 1980s, in
TRANSFORMATION AND STRUGGLE: CUBA FACES THE 1990S, at 179 (Sandor Halesbsky & John
M. Kirk eds., 1990) (discussing the 1974 Maternity Law); ISABEL HOLGADO FERNANDEZ, iNO
Es FACIL! MUJERES CUBANAS Y LA CRISIS REVOLUCIONARIA 92-94 (2000) (describing child-
care facilities called children's circles aimed at enabling women's workforce participation).
24 See K. LYNN STONER, FROM THE HOUSE TO THE STREETS: THE CUBAN WOMAN'S
MOVEMENT FOR LEGAL REFORM, 1896-1940, at 25-39 (1991).
25 FAMILY CODE (CUBA), Law No. 1289, Feb. 14, 1975, arts. 24, 26 (Official Publication of
the Ministry of Justice 1975) (providing that marriage partners have equal rights and duties
and that they both must care for the family); id. at art. 27 (stating that both spouses must
contribute to the needs of the family by sharing household duties and childcare, regardless of
whether only one or both partners work outside the home); id. at art. 28 (stating that both
partners have right to practice their profession or skill).
[Vol. 67
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is yes to both: In one case, culture resisted change; in the other, the
legal reforms effected cultural change.
First turning to the provision requiring equal responsibility in
childcare: notwithstanding the legal mandate, men do not share
equally in child-care and child-rearing responsibilities, and like
their exiled counterparts without the specific protections, Cuban
women bear a double burden.26 In Cuba, the average working
woman spends six hours and twenty-nine minutes at her occupation
and then an additional four hours and four minutes doing domestic
work.27 In comparison, the average man spends seven hours and
forty-eight minutes at his occupation and only thirty-two minutes
on domestic work.2" The reinforcement of the double-bind for Cuban
women is more than a theory-research shows that for all of its
paper reform, the Cuban revolution has been unable to eradicate
discriminatory gender roles imposed by society and culture.2 9
Instead, the socialist regime has enabled the reproduction of
cultural patterns that consider women to be the only ones
responsible for the care of the home and children by its ideological
privileging of economic issues and dictating, but not enforcing,
gender equality. This parallels the double burden that working
women in the United States-Latinas and non-Latinas alike-
bear. 30  In this context, for better or for worse, culture was
impermeable to changes sought to be effected by law.
Second, to explore the impact of the wholesale changes on culture,
I looked at family formation and dissolution. In pre-1959 Cuba, the
predominantly Catholic population had a relatively low rate of
divorce. In exile, from data on Cubans in Miami, the Cuban
population is still largely Catholic and has divorce rates that are
lower than either the general or the Latina/o population in the
United States. Therefore, any difference from this outcome shows
both a change from pre-1959 Cuba and from post-1959 Cuba in
exile, which, I would suggest, could be attributable to the wholesale
reforms instituted by the Castro regime. And indeed, such a change
has occurred.
Rather than intact marriages and a low incidence of divorce in
Castro's Cuba, one finds very high rates of divorce-in the fifty
26 Smith & Padula, supra note 23, at 177.
27 Diana M. Riveira, Women's Legal Advances in Cuba 34 (1989) (unpublished Masters
Thesis, University of Miami) (on file with author).
28 Id.
29 Smith & Padula, supra note 24.
30 See Uva de Arag6n, La Mujer Cubana: Historia e Infrahistoria (El Exilio), in LA MUJER
CUBANA: HISTORIA E INFRAHISTORIA 79, 86 (2000).
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percent range. Moreover, there has been a substantial
abandonment of formal marriage by many couples. From the
available research, which, not surprisingly, is limited, it is not
unusual to find persons entering into numerous serially
monogamous relations throughout the course of their life; some
formal, some informal. Indeed, it seems that it is not unusual for a
woman to have had five or six such relationships that have
produced children from five or six different fathers.1  One
noteworthy, if predictable, outcome in this context is that the
mother-child bond seems to persist not only as a very strong one,
but also as a primary one. Significantly, as the maternity laws
show, this relation is preserved and protected by the legal reforms.
This is even manifested in women who instruct the men in their
lives-who are not the child's father-not to discipline, scold, or
otherwise take responsibility for the child.
Why did particular laws on parenting and parental responsibility
fail to result in cultural change while the wholesale law reforms
succeeded in changing culture? Factors that favored cultural
change in light of the wholesale legal reforms are numerous. For
one, the taboo of sexuality that was enforced and reinforced by the
Catholic Church was eliminated and thus the external force that
effected one behavior (i.e., low incidence of divorce) was eliminated.
Another significant factor is that governmentally imposed economic
changes and expectations freed women from economic dependence
on their husbands. For example, there was a governmentally
created economic safety net that included free medical care for
women and their children, free education, free housing, and other
family support like the children's circles. This safety net allowed
women the economic freedom to end a marriage, as well as to enter
and exit other informal relationships. One author called this a shift
from private patriarchy to public patriarchy.32
Given these diametrically different outcomes of law effecting
cultural changes as evidenced by the wholesale reforms and the
particular legal change, respectively, the interesting question is
what factors can be identified that may determine the way culture
and law will affect each other? As of now, I have identified three
sets of factors that may explain the differences. One is the nature of
the change-whether the cultural tradition the law seeks to change
is a private or a public one. The second is the consequences of the
3" See generally HELEN I. SAFA, THE MYTH OF THE MALE BREADWINNER: WOMEN AND
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE CARIBBEAN (1995).
32 Id. at 165-66.
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change. This factor requires analyzing whether the cultural marker
is a burdensome or beneficial/liberating one so that the law can be
perceived, respectively, as liberating or subordinating. The third
component is the relation of the proponent of change to the culture.
This invites an interrogation of whether there are relations of power
at work that either will put their weight behind the change or will
resist it.
The inefficacy of the childcare normative change can thus be
explained because it is private conduct about which only the parties
involved will care. Further, the law is liberating for women but
burdensome for men; and men, utilizing in their favor the power of
the status quo, which deems as normative maternal, but not
paternal, involvement in domestic work, resist change. As an
interesting aside, the woman-subordinating status quo is also
reinforced and perpetuated by older women in an extended family
household-living conditions which are the norm in Cuba due to
extreme housing shortages. With such internal pressures-from
grandmothers and other female elders as well as from husbands-
culture resists change.
In contrast, the act of marriage is a public act. It was formerly
supported by the church which is now an outlawed institution
whose powerful hold yields to the government's strong hold on social
conduct. The notion of intact marriages was a burdensome one that
was kept in place by an institution that no longer exists. Further,
the power of the government in creating economic conditions that
liberated women from dependency on a sole spouse is also behind
effecting the cultural change. It is a norm that is empowering of
women, while not burdensome to men. Indeed, it is the culture of
socialism that outlawed religion and created complex economic
supports, having a change in law resulting from a change of state
culture.
As these examples show, and as theories considered together
collectively have posited, there is a strong nexus between law and
culture. But the power of influence goes both ways. In this regard,
I believe that it is not only appropriate but necessary to embrace a
cross-constitutive theory of law and culture.
20031
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